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Abstract 
The paper explores the role social network capital might play in facilitating poor agents’ 
escape from poverty traps. We model and simulate endogenous network formation among 
households heterogeneously endowed with both traditional and social network capital 
who make investment and technology choices over time in the absence of financial 
markets and faced with multiple production technologies featuring different fixed costs 
and returns. We show that social network capital can serve as either a complement to or a 
substitute for productive assets in facilitating some poor households’ escape from poverty. 
However, the voluntary nature of costly social network formation also creates both 
involuntary and voluntary exclusionary mechanisms that impede some poor households’ 
exit from poverty. Through numerical simulation, we show that the ameliorative potential 
of social networks therefore depends fundamentally on broader socioeconomic conditions, 
including the underlying wealth distribution in the economy, that determine the feasibility 
of social interactions and the net intertemporal benefits of social network formation. In 
some settings, targeted public transfers to the poor can crowd-in private resources by 
inducing new social links that the poor can exploit to escape from poverty. 
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Social Network Capital, Economic Mobility and Poverty Traps 
 
1. Introduction  
The persistent poverty widely observed in developing countries has motivated much 
research on poverty traps into which households may fall and from which they have 
difficulty escaping. The fundamental feature of most poverty trap models centers on the 
existence of financial market imperfections that impede investment in productive assets or 
technology, and thus prevent households with poor initial endowments from reaching 
higher-level equilibria in systems characterized by multiple equilibria.1 Meanwhile, a 
parallel literature emphasizes multiple pathways through which social network capital 
might facilitate productivity growth, technology adoption and access to (informal) 
finance.2 However, various studies also document the existence of exclusionary 
mechanism that can effectively prevent some poor from utilizing social networks to 
promote growth.3 Advances in understanding the nature and limits of social network 
capital formation could offer insights into whether and how poor households might avoid 
or escape poverty traps. There have been some notable recent efforts to make these links 
explicit.4  
This paper further explores the intersection between poverty traps and social 
networks by studying the mechanisms by which endogenous social network capital can 
facilitate or impede poor households’ escape from persistent poverty and the conditions 
that may affect such mechanisms. While some empirical studies – e.g., Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999) – find that social network capital effectively serves as a substitute for real 
capital in mediating economic mobility, others, such as Adato et al. (2006), suggest that 
accumulation of social network capital proves ineffective for households at the bottom of 
the economic pyramid in highly polarized economies. What roles might social network 
capital play in fostering or impeding the poor’s economic mobility? Why might 
                                                 
 
1 Examples include Loury (1981), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Dercon (1998), 
and Mookherjee and Ray (2002, 2003).  See Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) or Carter and Barrett (2006) 
for helpful reviews of key threads in the poverty traps literature. 
2 Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) offer excellent reviews. 
3 For example, Adato et al. (2006), Mogues and Carter (2005) and Santos and Barrett (2006), among others.  
4 See, for example, the recent volumes by Barrett (2005) and Bowles et al. (2006) and the December 2005 
special issue of the Journal of Economic Inequality on “Social Groups and Economic Inequality”.   
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endogenous social network formation help some poor households but not others? What 
determines the poverty reduction potential of social networks? In this paper we develop a 
simple, stylized optimization model and use simulations to elicit the quite mixed effects of 
social network capital on poor households’ well-being dynamics in order to answer these 
questions.   
The basic structure and intuition of our model runs as follows. Households 
heterogeneously endowed with privately owned capital assets and social network capital – 
from endowed (e.g., parents’) social networks – choose production technologies, 
consumption, and investment in assets and in social relationships with others in the 
economy (that confer future social network capital) so as to maximize their lifetime 
utility. We assume that social networks are costly to establish and maintain, have no 
intrinsic value and only function to provide access to partners’ (at least partially 
nonrivalrous) capital that can be used as productive input in the high-return technology. 
Social networks form endogenously based on mutual consent and result from optimal 
strategic interaction among all households in an economy. We simplify the setting by 
assuming perfect information and no financial markets.   
In this setting, analogous to other poverty traps models, some initially poor 
households will be caught in a low-level equilibrium because they lack access, through 
either endowments, markets or social mechanisms, to the productive assets needed in 
order for the most productive technology available to be the households’ optimal choice, 
albeit perhaps after a period of initial investment. Initially poor households without such 
access must resort to autarkic savings if they are to finance later adoption of the improved 
technology. Some find such investment attractive and thereby climb out of poverty of 
their own accord. Others find the necessary sacrifice excessive and optimally choose to 
remain relatively unproductive and thus poor. A third subpopulation might find 
bootstrapping themselves out of poverty unattractive, but will make the necessary 
investment if they receive some help from others, i.e., social network capital becomes 
necessary for an escape from persistent poverty. A fourth subpopulation is able and 
willing to make the necessary investment autarkically, but will find it more attractive to 
invest in social relations that offer a lower cost pathway to higher productivity. The 
initially poor are thus quite a heterogeneous lot, some enjoying independent growth 
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prospects, others with socially-mediated growth prospects, with social relations either 
complementing or substituting for own capital in economic mobility, while still others 
have no real growth prospects at all.  
The tricky part of the analysis stems from the fact that (i) social networks represent 
complex sets of dynamic relationships established non-cooperatively between mutually 
consenting agents, and (ii) a given relationship or link’s net value to any agent depends on 
the set of other links operational at the same time. Because the social network structure 
thus evolves endogenously and depends fundamentally on the wealth distribution of the 
underlying economy, the partitioning of the initially poor among the four subpopulations 
just identified will vary in both cross-section and time series. This complex 
interdependency in a setting with multiple and heterogeneous households poses an 
analytical challenge, which we address using numerical simulations. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes 
the empirical evidence on social network capital and key implications for endogenous 
network formation in low-income economies relevant to this paper. Section 3 develops a 
dynamic optimization model with endogenous network formation among heterogeneous 
households, describes the simple non-convex production technology set and households’ 
unilateral decisions, and explains the game theoretic approach we use to characterize 
endogenous network formation in this model. Section 4 then describes households’ 
equilibria for any equilibrium network that may arise in this stylized economy. We then 
discuss the roles social networks play and the resulting patterns of economic mobility and 
immobility using the distinguishable concepts of static and dynamic asset poverty 
thresholds as a function of asset and social network capital. We also review the model’s 
comparative statics. Section 5 illustrates these results and their implications by simulating 
randomly generated economies to demonstrate different mobility patterns of households 
in any economy and of households with identical initial endowments in different 
economies. The simulations also allow us to show, in section 6, how endogenous social 
network formation can overturn familiar policy implications generated by models without 
endogenous social interactions, as when public transfers to the poor no longer crowd-out 
private transfers but can, instead, crowd them in by inducing the creation of new social 
links. Section 7 concludes.  
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2.   Social network capital 
Despite its elusive definitions and applications, a rapidly growing literature on 
“social capital” emphasizes its potential to obviate market failures in low-income 
communities. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) distinguish between two broad concepts of 
social capital identifiable in the literature. First, social capital is sometimes referred to as a 
stock of trust and associated attachment(s) to a group or to society at large that facilitate 
coordinated action and the provision of public goods (Coleman 1988, Putnam et al.1993). 
A second conceptualization treats social capital as an individual asset conferring private 
benefits (Onchan 1992, Berry 1993, Townsend 1994, Foster and Rosenzweig 1995, 
Fafchamps 1996, Ghosh and Ray 1996, Kranton 1996, Barr 2000, Bastelaer 2000, Carter 
and Maluccio 2002, Conley and Udry 2002, Fafchamps and Minten 2002, Isham 2002, 
Fafchamps 2004, Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Moser and Barrett 2006). We employ the 
second conceptualization, which is sometimes referred to as “social network capital” so as 
to emphasize that households gain from linking with others to form social networks for 
mutual benefit (Granovetter 1995a, Fafchamps and Minten 2002).  
The literature identifies various pathways through which social networks might 
mediate economic growth: improved information flow and informal access to finance for 
technology adoption, market intelligence or contract monitoring and enforcement, access 
to loans or insurance, or provision of friendship or other intrinsically valued services.  For 
simplicity, this paper considers the setting where the sole function of a social network is 
to provide access to link partners’ (at least partially nonrivalrous) productive assets, which 
are essential for adoption of the high-return technology. Intuitively, this can be understood 
as sharing or borrowing tools, equipment or even animal or human labor, obtaining 
nonrivalrous capital-specific information, etc., which are costly, productive inputs in high-
return production.5 For example, a farmer’s social link to another farmer might afford free 
access to the latter’s tractor or at least to information that reduces tractor acquisition or 
operating costs if the farmer opts to buy a tractor himself. The social network in our 
                                                 
 
5 Note that such access does not need to be equivalent to that of the asset owner; it merely needs to be 
superior to that of others who do not have similar social access so that socially-mediated capital access 
reduces fixed costs of operating the high-return technology.  We develop this further in section 3.1. 
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setting thus has purely instrumental value in allowing one to accumulate social network 
capital, naturally defined as socially-mediated access to others’ productive assets.  
Social network capital is assumed to be productive only in the high-return 
production, but incompatible with the low-return, subsistent level of production. It is thus 
(imperfectly) substitutable for traditional, privately possessed capital.  
 The prospective benefits of social network capital create material incentives to 
establish social relations with others, even when it is costly to establish and maintain such 
relationships. The formation of a social network of bilateral relationships is thus a form of 
investment, akin to more conventional investment in traditional financial, natural or 
physical capital.  
 Social networks necessarily evolve endogenously. A small but growing literature 
demonstrates this empirically in the case of poor agrarian communities (Conley and Udry 
2001, Fafchamps and Minten 2001, DeWeerdt 2004, Santos and Barrett 2005, Fafchamps 
and Gubert 2007). Because social networks are (at least partly) the consequences of 
individual’s cost-benefit calculus with respect to prospective links with others, and those 
costs and benefits depend on social distance and the underlying structure of the economy, 
network structure is highly variable.  
Theorists have for some time offered insightful strategic models of endogenous 
network formation, building on seminal works by Aumann and Myerson (1988), Myerson 
(1991) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), among others. In recent years, formal 
theoretical models of network formation have been increasingly applied in development 
economics (Calvό-Armengol and Jackson 2004, Conley and Udry 2005, Genicot and Ray 
2005, Mogues and Carter 2005, Bloch et al. 2006). Nonetheless, most of the social 
networks studies related to economic development have been empirical, and in aggregate  
strongly suggest that not everyone benefits from social networks and that there exist 
patterns to failures to form network links (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). For example, 
Figueroa et al. (1996) point out that social exclusion has become a very active subject of 
debate concerning poverty in Europe. Carter and May (2001) and Adato et al. (2006) 
show that the voluntary and involuntary exclusion of poorer black households from the 
social networks of wealthier whites in South Africa has prolonged the legacy of apartheid 
and minimized the prospective benefits of social capital to the poor via obviating barriers 
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to entry into remunerative livelihoods. Santos and Barrett (2006) find that asset transfers 
through social networks in southern Ethiopia systematically exclude poorer households, 
corroborating insights from anthropologists and historians studying similar systems across 
rural Africa.   
Nonrandom patterns of unformed latent social links within a society reflect choices 
made by individuals to forego prospective relationships. We refer to the situation where 
an individual opts not to seek out partners as “social isolation”, reflecting voluntary self-
selection out of prospective networks.6 In other cases, individuals desire links with others 
but are rebuffed by prospective partners, resulting in involuntary “social exclusion”.7  We 
demonstrate below how patterns of social exclusion and isolation may turn fundamentally 
on the initial wealth distribution in an economy, with significant consequences for the 
growth prospects for the poor.8 In this way, models of endogenous social network capital 
as an input into productivity growth provide a natural link between the social networks 
literature and that relating income distribution to economic growth.9 Having situated this 
paper in the broader literature and laid out the core intuition and concepts, we now explain 
our stylized model in detail. 
 
3.   A simple dynamic optimization model with endogenous network formation 
 Assume n households exist in an economy, ( )nN ,...,2,1= . Each lives for two 
periods,10 .1,0=t  Each household i is initially endowed with two types of assets: 
traditional productive capital, denoted 0iA , representing a one-dimensional aggregate 
index measure of physical, natural, human and financial capital, and social network 
                                                 
 
6 Postlewaite and Silverman (2005), Kaztman (2001), Barry (1998), Wilson (1987), among others, similarly 
use the concept and term “social isolation” to reflect voluntary non-participation in a society’s institutions.   
7 Note that we use the term “social exclusion” very precisely, especially as compared to the literature on 
social exclusion as, more generally, “inability of a person to participate in basic day-to-day economic and 
social activities of life” (Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio 2006, p.397), as the term is used by, among others, 
Room (1995), Atkinson  (1998), Atkinson et al. (2002), and Bossert et al. (2007).  
8 We only directly refer to social isolation and social exclusion with respect to those agents who remain poor 
over time and do not establish social networks.  Extension to those non-poor who similarly do not link with 
others is straightforward, but omitted in the interest of focus on the paper’s core poverty traps theme. 
9 See, for example, Galor and Zeira (1993) or Mookherjee and Ray (2000), as well as the excellent review 
by Aghion et al. (1999). 
10 Population growth is assumed zero for both periods. 
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capital, denoted 0iS , referring to the traditional capital that might be acquirable from 
others in the endowed (e.g., parents’) social network. There is thus just one type of 
individually owned asset, but people can have access to it directly through private 
ownership or indirectly through their social network. The economy’s initial endowment 
distribution is denoted by ( )00 , SAλ . Households’ preferences are identical, with utility 
derived solely from consumption, as is the set of available production technologies to 
generate income from one’s capital stock. 
  
3.1   Production technology set 
The available production technology set in this economy consists of two technique-
specific production functions that generate low and high income at any period t, LtY  and 
H
tY , respectively, through 
( )tLLt AfY =                 (1) 
( ))( ttHHt SFAfY −=   with  ( ) 0≥tSF , ( ) 01 <′<− tSF  and ( ) 0=∞F .         (2) 
Technology L is a low-cost, low-return technique that everyone can afford. Technology H 
is a high-return technology with a fixed cost entry barrier, ( ) 0≥tSF . Greater capital is 
thus required to make technology H attractive because one has to cover the fixed cost of 
operation (i.e., this is not a one-time sunk cost of adoption). Social network capital 
reduces the fixed cost of using the high-return technology and is thus an imperfect 
substitute for owned capital.  
Each production technology fulfills standard curvature conditions. For net 
productive assets, ( ) 0≥−≡ ttHt SFANA  and 0≥≡ tLt ANA , (almost everywhere) twice-
differentiable functions ( )HtH NAf  and ( )LtL NAf  follow 
( ) ( ) 000 == LH ff           (3) 
( ) ( ) ∞=∂
∂=∂
∂
L
t
L
H
t
H
NA
f
NA
f 00      and   ( ) ( ) 0=∂
∞∂=∂
∞∂
L
t
L
H
t
H
NA
f
NA
f  (4) 
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In each period t, therefore, a household i’s aggregate production function can be 
described as 
MaxYit = [ LitHit YY , ] = Max [ ( ))( ititH SFAf − , ( )itL Af  ]                      (7) 
which yields a non-convex production set, with locally increasing returns in the 
neighborhood of ( )itSA , the asset threshold beyond which a household will optimally 
switch to the high-return production technology. ( )itSA  thus satisfies 
Hf [ ( ) )( itit SFSA − ]  = Lf [ ( )itSA ].                                                 (8) 
Figure 1 presents this aggregate production function as an outer envelope of the two 
specific production functions, with the threshold asset stock ( )itSA .11  
Social network capital thereby reduces the private asset stock necessary to make 
technology H optimal. As Sit increases, the high-return production function shifts in, 
lowering the minimum asset threshold needed to make high-return production optimal, 
i.e., ( ) 0<′ itSA , which follows implicitly from (8) and the assumption that F(·) is 
decreasing in Sit. This effect is depicted in Figure 2.  
An obvious implication is that the value of social network capital will vary across 
households. For households with sufficient privately-held assets, ( )ktkt SAA ≥ , adoption of 
H is optimal regardless of their stock of social network capital, but Sit  nonetheless reduces 
the fixed costs they incur, thereby increasing the productivity of their asset stock. Their 
investment incentives are thus driven by the relative costs of investment in social network 
capital and traditional, privately held assets.  
                                                 
 
11 This is in the spirit of Cooper (1987), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) or Azariadis and Drazen 
(1990), each of whom exploits similar technologies to analyze multiple equilibria. Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990) discuss how this type of non-convexity can arise as firms internally coordinate many complementary 
activities. Durlauf (1993) explores the role of complementarities and incomplete markets in economic 
growth under non-convexities of this type and shows that localized technological complementarities, when 
strong enough, produce long-run multiple equilibria. 
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Social network capital is potentially most valuable for those households k who 
possess insufficient assets themselves to adopt H, ( )ktkt SAA < , but who are “not too far” 
in some sense from ( )ktSA  so that investment in building social network capital can lower 
the critical threshold they face to the point that the high-return technology becomes 
optimal in the future. Because social network capital has no value for those who do not 
employ technology H, however, as one’s distance from ( )ktSA  increases the prospective 
benefit from increased future social network capital eventually falls once it will not 
suffice to bring the threshold down far enough, given the household’s current and 
prospective asset stock. For such households, there is no incentive to invest in social 
network capital, thus they will rationally self-select out of costly social relations, thereby 
becoming socially isolated. 
 
3.2   Household utility maximization 
 A household i derives utility solely from consumption each period, maximizing 
  ( ) ( )10 iii CuCuU ρ+=                     (9) 
where ρ  is the discount factor. We further assume there are no financial markets, thus 
autarkic saving is the only investment strategy. A subsistence consumption constraint 
applies such that for any level of  consumption necessary for survival 0>C ; 
−∞=)( itCu   for any CCir <  and .tr ≤                       (10) 
This puts a minimal limit on the intertemporal consumption tradeoff available to the 
household by permanently penalizing extremely low consumption in any period. 
In period 0, a household i with endowments ( )00 , ii SA  optimally chooses a 
production technology and allocates the resulting income from production among 
consumption ( 0iC ), investment in productive assets ( 0iI ) and investment in its social 
network ( ii KX 0′ ), which is the product of its network ( )0iX  – the binary (0,1) column 
vector reflecting the combination of social relationships it establishes during period 0 – 
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and the column vector of costs the household has to incur to establish or maintain12 these 
relationships (Ki).13  
Note that the household incurs costs in period 0 for establishing network Xi0, but it 
derives no immediate benefits. The laws of motion mapping initial endowments into 
stocks at the beginning of period 1 depreciate 0iA  and 0iS  at rates Aδ  and Sδ , 
respectively, while period 0 investments add to the stock of both assets. The new stock of 
social network capital is a function of the household’s social network at the end of period 
0 and the benefit function (Bi) that maps proportion of assets held by members of its 
established network into social network capital, as described in section 4. In period 1, the 
household again chooses the optimal production technology and consumes all the 
resulting income.14 
A key distinction between A and S is that the household unilaterally decides the 
stock of traditional capital it will own, but it does not unilaterally decide on its social 
network because each social link involves bilateral decisions by both prospective partners. 
The household’s social network is therefore the product of optimal social interactions, 
taking into consideration everyone in the economy’s network preferences. A household’s 
utility maximizing network might therefore prove infeasible because its preferred link 
partners do not have reciprocal desires for an active link. In modeling the household’s 
decision, we thus define ( )000 iiui XXX −=  as household i’s desired, unilateral network 
choice conditional on others’ choices, denoted by .0iX −   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
12 Because, realistically, some agents begin with inherited social network capital – e.g., familial ties with 
biological relatives and parents’ close associates – we assume that household’s endowed social network 
capital exists independent of its de novo network link choices, subject only to a uniform rate of depreciation 
of the social network capital – think of this as mortality or out-migration of pre-existing ties.  
13 Both Ki and Xi0 are described in more detail in the next section. 
14 Zero investment in the terminal period is obviously an artefact of our simplifying assumption of a known, 
finite lifetime with no subsequent generations. 
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( ) ( ) ( ){ }Max uiiuiiuii XCXIXC 010000 ,,( )uii XV 0*
Specifically, the indirect utility that household i with endowments ( )00 , ii SA  derives 
from a possible network choice uiX 0  is simply 
                            =                  ( ) ( )10 ii CuCu ρ+              (11) 
 subject to:  ( ) iuiiiiii KXISAYC 000000 , −−≤  
    ( ) 001 1 iiAi IAA +−= δ  
    ( ) iuiiSi BXSS 001 1 +−= δ  
    ( )1111 , iiii SAYC ≤  
    0, 11 ≥ii AS  
., 10 CCC ii ≥  
The production function follows (7) and the subsistence constraint is incorporated into the 
final constraint on consumption. Each household can perform intertemporal cost-benefit 
calculus for any of their network choices conditional on choices of others. We now detail 
the specifications for the endogenous network formation and the suitable equilibrium 
concept in order to resolve this intertemporal optimization problem. 
 
3.3   Endogenous network formation 
 Because the formation of links is a strategic decision affecting households’ optimal 
consumption and investment decisions, we model network formation as a non-cooperative 
game in which link formation is based on a binary process of mutual consent between 
individuals who costlessly observe the current wealth distribution. Due to the multiplicity 
of equilibria, many of which make little sense from a social network perspective, we 
reduce the range of feasible equilibria through imposing two restrictions. The first follows 
from the fact, well-established in sociology, that active social networks are primarily 
formed among individuals already acquainted with one another. This implies a central role 
for social distance in determining the net benefits of active link formation. We let social 
distance affect the individual-specific costs and benefits of link formation in a way that 
helps limit the range of prospective links to a domain over which they are most likely. 
Second, we model network formation using an extensive form game of link formation 
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with perfect information, which allows us to find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
(SPNE) social network in this economy. 
 
Social distance, feasible interactions and link-specific cost-benefit analysis 
 A broad literature suggests there exist boundaries to prospective social interactions. 
Santos and Barrett (2005, 2006), among others, find that not everyone knows everyone 
else, even in small, ethnically homogeneous rural settings in which households pursue the 
same livelihood, and that knowing someone is effectively a precondition to establishing 
an active link. Consistent with this, many models of network formation emphasize local 
interactions within prescribed neighborhoods (Ellison 1993, Ellison and Fudenberg 1993, 
Fagiolo 2001).  
 In our setting, each household is characterized by its universally observable ( )00 , SA  
endowment. Thus each household can identify its social distance from every other 
household in ( )SA,  space. As in Akerlof (1997) or Mogues and Carter (2005), we use the 
geometric distance between households’ endowments to reflect social distance,  
( ) ( ) ( )200200, jiji SSAAjid −+−= α ; 0≥α ,          (12) 
for any pair of households, i and j, where α  establishes the relative weight of pre-existing 
social network capital in determining social distance. Conceptually, social distance 
measures relative proximity between two households, which reflects the degree of 
discomfort in their social interaction. It can thus serve as a proxy for the cost of 
establishing and maintaining a social relationship. 
Formally, a household i incurs total costs of ii KX 0′  to establish its network of links 
0iX , where Ki is a column vector of costs they have to incur to establish each active link. 
To keep the analysis as general as possible, the economic cost to household i to establish a 
link with household  j can be written as 
( ) ( )( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⋅=
0
0,
i
j
i A
A
jidkjK      with 0>′k  for djid ≤),( , ∞=′k  otherwise.          (13) 
The idea is that it is easier to establish a link with people who are socially proximate, 
hence the cost function ( )( )jidk , that is increasing in d. Further, we allow for asymmetric 
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costs, here specified such that the poorer partner incurs more costs in link formation. We 
assume no economies of scale or scope in building networks.  
 The constant d  reflects a social distance threshold beyond which social interaction 
is not feasible.15 In our context, d is economy-specific but universal to each household in 
the economy.16 It implicitly reflects physical and social barriers on the probability that 
individuals meet and interact. A low d  can represent an economy in which households 
cluster into many small groups of shared characteristics with low inter-group connectivity 
or an economy characterized by significant ethnic, racial or religious discrimination or 
physical isolation. A high d , on the other hand, allows for greater social interactions.  
 The benefits to household i from the active links in its social network are reflected in 
the column vector Bi, mapping some proportion of its partners’ asset endowments into 
augmentation of its social network capital next period. Specifically, the gross benefit to 
household i from a link with household j follows 
 ( ) ( )000 , jiji AAAbjB −=         where 10 1 <′< b  , 01 2 <′<− b                    (14) 
 Implicitly, 10 1 <′< b  emphasizes the nature of access to link partners’ (at least 
partially nonrivalrous) capital.17 This generalization is highly stylized but very intuitive. 
Some components of the composite asset are nonrivalrous (e.g., equipment-specific 
knowledge). Others, such as tools and equipment, can be shared and thus used at different 
time without materially affecting the owner’s (or other borrowers’) use, but perhaps with 
degraded performance for the borrower (e.g., due to imperfect timing). Whether one 
considers this unfettered, occasional or probabilistic access, the key is that i’s access to 
socially-mediated capital is increasing in the stock of links’ privately-held assets. 
 As with the costs of links, we assume that social network capital benefits are link-
specific and independent of all other links the household establishes. The social network 
capital gained from a link is not symmetric to both members of the dyad for the simple 
                                                 
 
15 In the language of the networks literature, d distinguishes between local and global interactions. 
16 This assumption is reasonable give households’ identical preferences. The sensible extension of this 
context is to allow d  to vary with other socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., initial endowments, groups). 
17 Note that in this simple model, benefits are only generated from direct links. There are no benefits from 
being connected to other households indirectly through one’s direct links. 
 
 
14
reason that a poorer household can call on more resources from their richer partner than 
vice versa. Extreme differences in wealth, however, may hinder mutual benefits, as 
reflected in the second argument in (14). Intuitively, the specific capital of one partner 
might be inappropriate to a partner employing quite different practices due to stark wealth 
differences. More generally, the asymmetric specification of (14) fits the empirical pattern 
that wealthy households are more likely to opt out of links with much poorer partners than 
vice versa (Santos and Barrett 2005). In similar spirit, very poor households might not 
find it attractive to link with far richer ones with whom they share little (Mogues and 
Carter 2005).  
 Two fundamental points distinguish our network formation model from others. First, 
costs and benefits of links are realized intertemporally.18 A household’s preference over 
possible networks, therefore, relies on its realized net intertemporal utility gains. Second, 
household i’s decision to link with household j is interdependent with its decision to link 
with others. A link with one household might complement or substitute for links with 
others. The multiple equilibria in our setting accentuate this interdependency because only 
those households that can accumulate enough resources to make the high-return 
production technology optimal will benefit from social network capital. Therefore, many 
households’ valuation of a given link is conditional on their success in establishing other 
links as well. To take into account these spillover possibilities, households’ network 
strategies involve choosing among possible networks of links, instead of just myopically 
considering each link separately.  
 We use the notation ij  to describe the binary link between households i and j. 
According to (13), social links can be established within the feasible interaction space 
determined by d . The network of household i, reflecting the combination of its binary 
links, is represented by the vector: 
                    ( )( )djidijNjijxX i ≤≠∈= ),(,,     where  { }1,0)( ∈ijx .          (15) 
                                                 
 
18 In existing network formation models, relationship payoffs occur within the period (Jackson and 
Wolinsky 1996, Johnson and Gilles 2000, Calvo-Armensol and Jackson 2001, Goyal and Joshi 2002).  
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The binary index ( )ijx  is defined by joint agreement to establish a link, ( ) 1=ijx , 
otherwise ( ) 0=ijx . Household i’s set of all feasible networks can then be represented by 
{ }{ }1,0)(/ ∈=Ω ijxX ii .         
 By way of illustration, consider an economy with { }5,4,3,2,1=N  and the 
endowment distribution ( )00 , SAλ  illustrated in figure 3. For 9=d , for example, 
household 3’s network can be generally represented by 
( )
( )
( )⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
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⎜
⎝
⎛
=
34
32
31
3
x
x
x
X  with ( ) { }1,03 ∈kx  
for all 4,2,1=k . Clearly interaction between 3 and 5 is not feasible because 
)5,3(d > 9=d  . Hypothetically, 
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3X  represents household 3’s network that consists 
of only a link with household 1. 
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with whom interaction is feasible, while 
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3X  presents the case where household 3 
has no links.  
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3  thus represents the set of all 
feasible network. 
 The indirect utility ( )ii XV *  associated with the network choice iX 19 can naturally 
be used to compare among household i’s feasible networks. And thus household’s 
preference over the feasible networks can be obtained by ranking their feasible networks 
based on the corresponding ( )ii XV * . Strategic interactions among all households in the 
economy then involve households choosing their network of social links from the set of 
                                                 
 
19 The time index 0=t is dropped here. In the next section, however, the optimal network is denoted as *0iX . 
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feasible ones using the resulting set of ranked networks, RankediΩ  as their reaction function 
in an extensive form game of link formation, which we now describe.  
 
Linking game with perfect information 
Because network link formation is a strategic decision affecting households’ optimal 
consumption and investment decisions, it is natural to model network formation as a non-
cooperative game. The mutual consent requirement of link formation poses a hurdle, 
however, to the use of any off-the-shelf solution technique, especially due to issues of 
multiplicity and stability of equilibria (Jackson 2005). Reviewing seminal models of link 
formation, Jackson (2005) concludes that the mutual consent requirement for link 
formation implied either some sort of coalitional equilibrium concept or an extensive form 
game with a protocol for proposing and accepting links in some sequence.  As the purpose 
of this paper is not to study the nature of network formation per se, but rather to use a 
sensible equilibrium network concept to analyze the ways in which the resulting social 
network capital mediates economic mobility, we opt for the latter approach and develop a 
reasonable extensive form game of network formation with perfect information that yields 
a SPNE network.  
 We model households attempting to establish their utility maximizing network as 
players interacting over multiple rounds of link proposing, accepting and rejecting, using 
Ranked
iΩ as their best response function. This extensive form game thus involves an 
algorithm for proposing and accepting links that yields a sequential matching process.20 
At the beginning of the game there are no pre-established links between any player 
households.21 Initially, households consider their top-ranked network. They 
simultaneously propose to each of the other households with which they wish to link. The 
link between two households is established if and only if (i) both agents propose to each 
                                                 
 
20 This specification is in the context of a matching game in the domain of a coalitional game, in which each 
household may be matched with many others. Our matching specification differs greatly, however, from 
Gale and Shapley’s (1962) original approach, which considers a two-sided one-to-one matching game in 
which members of two sides are referred to as Xs and Ys. It also differs from marriage models and the 
roommates problem in which individuals can match with only one partner.  
21 Think of S0 as reflecting one’s inherited links with an older generation and the network choice, Xi, as 
being with one’s own generation.  
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other, and (ii) at least one of the two partners optimizes its network (i.e., has all of its 
proposals accepted). Once a household optimizes its network, its game is concluded. For 
any of its partners that do not likewise optimize their networks, these established links are 
binding. Such partners continue to play the game, with their utility maximization now 
constrained by the link commitment. All households that do not optimize their networks 
in a proposal round move on to the next round, when they again simultaneously propose 
to each of those households still active in the game with whom they wish to link in their 
top-ranked still-feasible network (which must include any pre-existing link commitments 
from prior rounds with households that have concluded play). The same link formation 
rule is followed. The game then repeats itself if there remain households without 
optimized networks. The entire history of offers, acceptances and rejections is known to 
all households. 
 If no household can optimize its network in a specific stage, and thus no binding 
link can be established, we assume that the poorest household (i.e., the one with lowest 
A0) has to forego its top-ranked network and instead use its second-best network while the 
rest still play their top-ranked networks. If still no one can optimize the network, the 
second poorest household then sacrifices its first-best network and must make link 
proposals to its second-best network while all richer households still play their first-best 
strategy, and so on. The process of sequential matching continues until everyone 
optimizes their networks following the protocol outlined above. For any preferences, the 
process eventually stops because there exists a finite set of households in this economy.  
 This process results in a set of links. We will denote this set by g. Household i’s 
social network derived from this resulting set of link g can then be denoted ( )gX i . The 
payoff to each household i is then defined by the corresponding indirect utility 
( )( )gXV ii* . Given perfect information, this protocol generates a SNPE in pure strategies 
(Selten 1975).  
 Figure 4 provides a numerical illustration of this algorithm and its SPNE for the five 
player example economy from Figure 3.  Note three interesting aspects of this proposed 
game. First, even if proposals are matched, this does not guarantee the establishment of a 
link. Binding links are established only if (at least) one partner optimizes its network. This 
follows directly from the fact that households’ preferences with respect to individual links 
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are governed by their preferences over their broader networks, as reflected in RankediΩ . 
Second, households’ optimal networks in equilibrium are not necessarily their first-best 
ones, due to the interactive nature of the link formation process and the spillovers inherent 
to the process economywide. This creates a stark contrast vis-à-vis the optimality 
conditions that would result from unilateral decisions regarding social network structure. 
Third, the game’s SPNE network tends to favor those households able and/or preferring to 
link with a small number of others.22  
 We then use 100 randomly generated economies to explore some simple properties 
of this endogenous network formation. Appendix 2 reports the details of the baseline 
parameterization of the model.  Appendix 3 includes detailed results of sensitivity analysis 
performed by varying some of the more important parameter values. Explicit examination 
of other properties of this extensive game with large number of heterogeneous players is 
very difficult23 and is not in the objective of this paper.  
    
4.   Households’ equilibria and patterns of economic mobility 
 Due to the mutual consent requirement for link formation, household i’s optimal 
network  in the SPNE of the extensive form game just described constrains the optima for 
each household in the economy, not just for i’s optimal technology choice, welfare, etc. 
The equilibria of this model are, therefore, characterized by every household’s 
accumulation decisions,{ } niii IX ,...,1*0*0 , = , which determine current and future technology 
choice, consumption levels, and thus each household’s level of well-being. 
 The preceding model specifications prepare us now to study how social network 
capital influences households’ economic mobility through their optimal network 
formation and capital accumulation decisions. We study a general case where each 
                                                 
 
22 This is illustrated in the simulation statistics in Appendix 1.Those for whom no links are feasible or who 
do not wish to establish any social links (i.e., socially isolated households) necessarily always get their first-
best network. Thereafter, the proportion of households attaining their first-best network in equilibrium is 
declining monotonically in desired network size (Figure A2) and non-monotonically in feasible network 
size (Figure A1).  This merely reflects that more complex networks are harder to establish. 
23 Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000), among others, successfully 
analyze these sorts of extensive game, but with only three players.  
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household i, initially endowed with ( )00 , ii SA , faces the unilateral intertemporal utility 
maximization problem (11) with the general instantaneous utility function:  
  ( ) θ
θ
−=
−
1
1
it
it
C
Cu      ; 10 <≤θ ,                         (16) 
where θ  determines the household’s willingness to shift consumption between periods. 
The smaller is θ , the more slowly marginal utility falls as consumption rises, and so the 
more willing the household is to allow its consumption to vary over time. We consider the 
non-convex production technology set in each period 1,0=t described in (7) in the general 
Cobb-Douglas form              
( ) MaxSAY itit =, [ ( ) ( )( ) 21 21 , αα ititit SFAkAk − ] , 1,0 21 << αα , 12 αα > , 0, 21 >kk .    (17) 
We specifically concentrate on the setting in which high-return production is always 
preferable to the lower return technology. Without the borrowing constraint, every 
household would gradually converge to this superior equilibrium, whether through 
borrowing, autarkic savings, or both. The assumptions of constrained autarkic savings – 
per (10) – and no borrowing thus lead to the existence of multiple equilibria, one of which 
is the poverty trap associated with continued use of the low-return technology.  
 
4.1   The benchmark case without a social network  
We now analyze the benchmark case without social networks, in which the 
household’s optimal welfare depends solely on its autarkic savings and accumulation 
capacity. The next subsection then expands the analysis to consider the case in which 
households can form social networks and explores how this affects economic mobility, 
especially among those who might otherwise be trapped in poverty. 
 The case where 0=itS t∀ , implying no functioning social network, replicates a 
traditional poverty traps model. The non-convex production set in (17) implies an asset 
threshold A  such that, at any period t, those with AAt ≥  can optimally undertake high-
return production.24 For simplicity’s sake, assume those who choose the low return 
technology (the first argument on the right-hand side of (17)) generate income that leaves 
                                                 
 
24 A  satisfies a condition analogous to that in (8). 
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them poor while those who choose the high-return technology (the second argument on 
the right-hand side of (17)) earn income that renders them non-poor.  Thus threshold A  
represents a static asset poverty line, which distinguishes current poor from non-poor. In 
any period t, the poor in our context are, therefore, those households with AAt < , i.e., 
those currently undertaking low-return production. 
 Household i’s first-order conditions for an interior optimum thus potentially yield 
two equilibria: the low-level equilibrium (poverty trap) ( )0,0 00* == iiiL XSU  and the 
high-level equilibrium ( )0,0 00* == iiiH XSU .25 At the superior one, the household equates 
the loss to lifetime utility due to foregone present consumption with the discounted utility 
gain that results from investment in the high-return production technology according to  
 ( ) 1*122*1*0 2)0()()( −−− −⋅= αθθ αρ FAkCC HiHiHi  .          (18) 
The second term on the right side of (18) represents the marginal return of the high-return 
production evaluated at the optimal net asset in the last period. Analogous to the Euler 
equation, this equation describes the household’s equilibrium behavior such that the 
accumulated asset stock in equilibrium is  
 ( ) ( )021
1
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1
*
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−αθ
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This yields optimal first period consumption of 
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where the second term on the right-hand side represents the optimal investment 
requirement to achieve the high-level equilibrium. Only those households who can afford 
the corresponding autarkic savings (i.e., CC Hi ≥*0 ) will converge to this superior 
equilibrium. They derive the optimal consumption in the terminal period, 
                                                 
 
25 To ensure the existence of the equilibria, we assume that accumulation toward *iLU  is at least feasible, 
i.e., for every household i, CC Li ≥*0 .  
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( ) 2)0(*12*1 αFAkC HiHi −= . The lower θ  – i.e., the more willing they are to substitute 
consumption between the two periods – the more the household saves in response to the 
high-return potential. In the limiting case of linear utility (when 0=θ ), household’s 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution becomes ∞ , yielding maximal willingness to bear 
short-term reductions in current consumption in order to take advantage of high future 
returns on investment. 
 In the low-level poverty trap equilibrium, by contrast, the Euler equation describing 
household behavior implies optimal asset holdings such that  
   ( )( )θαρα 11*111*
0
*
1 1−= Li
Li
Li Ak
C
C
      ⇔     ( ) .11
1
*
1
*
0
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*
1
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−
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corresponding to optimal first period consumption of  
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 Now consider the benchmark setting where it is possible for some initially poor 
household to escape poverty. Formally, an initially poor household graduates to the high-
level equilibrium, and thereby escapes poverty, through autarkic savings if and only if 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) CAF
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 Typical for any poverty trap model, (18) and (23) suggests the existence of a 
dynamic asset threshold *0A  at which optimal household savings (i.e., asset accumulation) 
bifurcates. Those initially poor households with *00 AAA i ≥> 26 will save and escape 
                                                 
 
26 Given our assumptions, it is necessarily true that AA ≤*0 . By way of proof, suppose instead that AA >*0  
and consider an individual endowed with *00 AAA i << . As 0iAA < , ( ) 21 )0()( 0201 αα FAkAk ii −< , and so the 
household can initially adopt high-return production technology. Thus, ( ) ( ) 2)0(020 αFAkAY i −= . But as 
*
00 AAi < , CC Hi <*0  implies ( ) ( ) ( ) CFkAFAk iAi <−−−+− − )0(1)0( 22 1 122002 αα ραδ . This, however, 
contradicts (23). 
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poverty in the future (albeit not in the initial period), while other poor with *00 AAi <  are 
trapped in long-term poverty. This dynamic asset threshold is analogous to the dynamic 
asset poverty line proposed by Carter and Barrett (2006). In the absence of social network 
capital, a household’s initial endowment of productive assets, 0iA , determines its long-
term equilibrium well-being. Note also that by this construction initially non-poor 
households (whose *00 AAAi >≥ ) are always able to achieve the high-return equilibrium.27 
 
4.2   The possibilities presented by social networks and their limitations 
 Let us now introduce the possibility of social network capital that reduces the fixed 
cost associated with using the high-return production technique. This generalizes the static 
asset poverty line ( )tSA  such that any household with ( )00 ii SAA ≥  optimally undertakes 
high-return production in period 0, while those with ( )00 ii SAA <  optimally choose the 
low-return technique in the first period. ( )0iSA  thus solves 
 ( ) 1][ 01 αiSAk  =  ( ) ( ) 2][ 002 αii SFSAk −               (24) 
with ( ) 0' 0 <iSA , so that greater social network capital lowers the static asset poverty line, 
as previously discussed in section 3.1. In this way, one’s inherited social network capital 
can make high-return production technologies, and thus a higher equilibrium standard of 
living, immediately attainable when one’s private stock of capital would not otherwise 
suffice.  Further, those endowed with adequate social network capital might not need to 
invest in building further social links so as to accumulate social network capital. 
 The existence of multiple equilibria follows directly from our previous assumptions 
on the feasibility of poverty trap equilibrium. For any optimal social network 0iX  that 
household i establishes, the superior equilibrium of well being can be described by 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
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C
XU  , where     (25) 
                                                 
 
27 This condition rules out the possibility of downward mobility of the initially non-poor, which is 
reasonable given there is no uncertainty in the model.  
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The last term on the right-hand side again indicates the optimal investment required to 
reach the superior equilibrium. Household i with optimal social network 0iX  can achieve 
the high-level equilibrium ( )0* iiH XU  if and only if ( ) CXC iHi ≥0*0 . Otherwise, they will 
converge slowly to the poverty trap equilibrium ( )0* iiL XU  with  
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 Perhaps more interestingly, and less obviously, household i’s ability to establish a 
network 0iX  may affect the dynamic asset poverty line. Consider an initially poor 
household (whose ( )00 ii SAA < ). It can gradually accumulate resources toward the high-
level equilibrium, and thus escape future (but not current) poverty, if it establishes a 
productive network 0iX such that
28 
( ) CXC iHi ≥0*0       ⇔                 (27)  
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         Therefore, according to (27), there exist three distinct avenues by which the initially 
poor can reach the high-level equilibrium. First, a poor household can undertake autarkic 
savings, just as in the previous section without social network capital.  Note that unlike in 
                                                 
 
28 If there exists a network 00 ≠iX  such that ( ) 00*0 >iHi XC , then ( ) ( )00*0* => iiLiiH XUXU  if 
( ) ( )00*00*0 => iHiiHi XCXC  by assumptions. Thus the benefit of reaching the high-level equilibrium induces 
the household to make costly links, if it can afford to do so. Of course,  if ( ) ( ) CXCXC iHiiHi >>= 0*00*0 0 , then 
it is optimal for the household to graduate from poverty through autarkic savings. 
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the preceding case, a greater endowment of social network capital ( 0iS ) reduces the 
savings required to reach ( )0iSA  - as 0)( <⋅′F  - and thus to reach the high-level 
equilibrium in the future. Those well-endowed with social network capital are thus better 
positioned to escape poverty through an autarkic savings strategy. Second, the initially 
poor household can establish new social links that generate enough future social network 
capital to drive down ( )1iSA  to the point that the high-return technology becomes optimal 
in the next period, without necessarily having to accumulate capital itself. Third, the 
household can invest in both social links to lower the asset threshold and private capital to 
augment its initial endowment and let it attain this lowered threshold level. 
 These latter two avenues indicate that the dynamic asset poverty threshold depends 
not only on household’s initial endowments ( )00 , ii SA , but also on the poor’s opportunity 
to establish a social network, 0iX , that could generate the social network capital necessary 
for them to graduate from poverty. Thus factors that determine the poor’s ability to 
establish a productive social network, such as the broader wealth distribution in the 
economy and the maximum social distance over which links are feasible in a given 
society, therefore also influence the initially poor’s long-term well-being. Unlike standard 
poverty traps models in which one’s initial conditions determine one’s growth prospects, 
in a setting where social interactions can condition investment behavior, the initial 
conditions of the entire economy now matter. 
 Intuitively, (27) suggests that there exists a dynamic asset threshold conditional on a 
given endowed network structure, ( )0/ 00*0 =ii XSA , such that for initially poor households 
with ( ) ( )0000*0 0/ iiii SAAXSA <≤= , 
     
( ) CXC iHi ≥= 00*0   ⇔                          (28) 
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Such households gradually escape poverty without needing to establish a new social 
network 0iX  to accumulate their (already sufficient) social network capital. For them, 
 
 
25
new social links are attractive if and only if the feasible network 0iX  increases welfare by 
reducing the fixed costs of production enough to (at least) offset the costs of establishing 
the links – i.e., if it permits positive net intertemporal welfare gains. Therefore, the 
feasible network 0iX  they will consider needs to follow  
( ) ( )00*00*0 => iHiHi XCXC      ⇔                                                                                      (29) 
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The intuition is that a household will invest in social network formation if the associated 
cost savings on physical capital investment outweigh the costs of establishing such a 
network.  
 Other initially poor households with ( ) ( )000*00 0/ iiii SAXSAA <=<  cannot reach 
the high-level equilibrium without establishing new social links so as to accumulate 
additional social network capital and thereby make future adoption of the high-return 
technology optimal. Among the initially poor households (whose ( )00 ii SAA < ), we can 
therefore further identify initial asset positions for which social network capital 
complements or substitutes for productive assets in facilitating upward economic 
mobility. Because those endowed with ( )00*0 ii SAAA <≤  can escape from poverty even 
without inheriting or building social network capital, investment in 0iX  is only optimal if 
it efficiently substitutes for productive asset accumulation – i.e., if establishing links is 
cheaper than capital investment for the household – in advancing economic mobility. For 
such households, social network capital reduces the savings required to graduate to the 
high-level equilibrium and thereby increases lifetime utility. In such cases, social network 
capital is a substitute for traditional capital accumulation in facilitating productivity and 
welfare growth.  
 For the initially poor households (whose ( )00 ii SAA < ) endowed with *00 AAi < , 
however, social network capital is a complement to traditional capital accumulation, in 
that it is needed in order to lower the asset poverty threshold and thereby enable the 
household to escape from poverty in the future. There are two distinct subpopulations 
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among those for whom social network capital is a complement to traditional capital in 
mediating economic mobility. First, those with ( ) *0000*0 0/ AAXSA iii <≤=  are endowed 
with sufficient social network capital that, even with social network capital 
depreciation, Sδ , their extant social network capital suffices to enable traditional capital 
accumulation enough to reach the high-level equilibrium in period 1. Second, households 
with ( ) *000*00 0/ AXSAA iii <=<  need to form new social links – i.e., invest in 0iX – to 
augment their initial social network capital endowment in order to complement asset 
accumulation necessary to escape future poverty. Their potential to escape poverty thus 
relies on the capacity and possibility to establish productive social network. 
 A still different equilibrium emerges for any household that fails to meet condition 
(28) – either because it has inadequate endowments ( )00 , ii SA  or because there is no 
feasible network 00 iiX Ω∈  that would generate sufficient social network capital to let it 
reach the high-level equilibrium – will never consider establishing a social network with 
others. Because establishing social links is costly and the household will never benefit 
from these, very poor and socially distant households optimally self-select out of social 
networks, choosing instead self-imposed social isolation. This follows from (26): 
 ( ) ( )0*0* 0 iiLiiL XUXU )>= , 00 ≠∀ iX) .             (30) 
This captures the notion that for many poor people, social networks do not provide a 
viable escape route from long-term poverty, as Mogues and Carter (2005) and Adato et al. 
(2006) argue with reference to post-apartheid South Africa. 
  
4.3   Patterns of social network-mediated economic mobility and immobility 
 So far we have treated households’ optimal social networks as if they are 
exogenously given. Now we consider what happens as one inserts households into a 
broader society in which the mutual consent requirement governs social network 
formation, yielding an optimal network structure, .*0iX  Four distinct patterns of economic 
mobility and immobility emerge among the initially poor (whose ( )00 ii SAA < ) upon 
realization of their optimal network .*0iX  In section 5 we explore, via simulation, the 
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process by which these patterns originate. Here we simply characterize these distinct 
subpopulations, building directly on the previous sub-section. 
(1) Households who escape from poverty without forming social networks 
 One subpopulation of the initially poor enjoy sufficient initial endowments, 
( )0/ 00*00 => iii XSAA , that they can accumulate resources autarkically, pulling 
themselves up to the high-level equilibrium in period 1 by their own bootstraps without 
investing in accumulating further social network capital. Their optimality condition can be 
characterized as 
 0*0 =iX   and  ( )0*0** == iiHi XUU .                           (31) 
Among this group, some households never consider establishing a new network, as all of 
their possible networks would yield non-positive net intertemporal utility gain, i.e.,  
( ) ( )00*0* =< iiHiiH XUXU v , 00 iiX Ω∈∀ v . Other households may be regrettably autarkic in 
their climb out of poverty, having failed to establish any preferred network, 00ˆ iiX Ω∈  
such that ( ) ( )0ˆ 0*0* => iiHiiH XUXU . This latter subgroup’s first-best arrangement proves 
socially infeasible, leaving them worse off than they might have been under a different 
equilibrium social network configuration, but still able to exit poverty in time. 
(2) Households who form social networks and thereby escape from poverty 
A second subpopulation of the initially poor successfully establishes networks with 
others, utilizing their accumulated productive social network capital so as to graduate 
from poverty. Their optimality condition can be characterized as 
 0*0 ≠iX   and  ( )*0** iiHi XUU = .                    (32) 
This subpopulation’s experience of a socially-mediated climb out of poverty is the 
phenomenon that excites the imagination of the most ardent fans of social capital as an 
instrument for poverty reduction. Among this group, there are likewise two distinct 
subgroups. Those initially poor households with ( )0/ 00*00 =≥ iii XSAA  find it cheaper to 
use social network in mediating economic mobility, but they can escape the poverty trap 
regardless. Social capital improves their welfare but it does not fundamentally alter the 
qualitative path they follow over time. 
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 By contrast, the crucial subpopulation is those with ( )0/ 00*00 =< iii XSAA . Their 
escape from poverty will not be possible if they cannot build a productive social network.  
Their initial endowment of both assets and social network capital is insufficient for them 
to climb out of poverty in time unless they can find other households willing to link with 
them.  This subpopulation is fortunate in that the underlying attribute distribution in the 
economy generated sufficient social proximity that others were willing to link with these 
poor households. 
(3) Households involuntarily excluded from social networks and trapped in poverty 
Others are not so fortunate. The next subpopulation of the initially poor could escape 
from poverty if they were able to establish one or more of their preferred social networks. 
However, they are rebuffed by those they approach for possible links and in the absence 
of their desired social network capital, they cannot accumulate enough traditional capital 
to climb out of poverty. Involuntary social exclusion thus conspires with meager initial 
asset endowments to trap these households in long-term poverty. A bit more formally, 
although there exists at least one network 00
~
iiX Ω∈  such that ( ) CXC iHi >0*0 ~ , no such 
network arises in equilibrium. Thus they resort to 0*0 =iX , although this is not their 
preferred network. Their optimality condition is represented by 
0*0 =iX  , ( )0*0** == iiLi XUU   and 00~ iiX Ω∈∃  such that ( ) CXC iHi >0*0 ~ .       (33) 
This constrained optimum best illustrates how social networks can fail the poor because of 
the mutual consent condition that underpins the formation of social links. 
(4) Households who choose social isolation and remain trapped in poverty 
The final subpopulation comprises those with especially meager endowments, 
( )0/ 00*00 =< iii XSAA , who have no possibility to escape poverty no matter the social 
networks they create. None of their feasible networks, 00 iiX Ω∈ , would generate 
sufficient social network capital to complement traditional capital accumulation in 
fostering upward economic mobility. Since links are costly to establish and only yield 
welfare gains if one employs the high-return technology they will never optimally choose, 
this subpopulation does not value social network capital and therefore does not establish 
any links in equilibrium. Their optimality condition can be characterized as  
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0*0 =iX  , ( )0*0** == iiLi XUU  and ( ) CXC iHi <0*0 s   for all 00 iiX Ω∈s .          (34) 
Since 0*0 =iX  is their top-ranked network choice in Rankedi0Ω , they self-select out of social 
networks, rejecting any proposals made to them by others in the economy. The result is 
socially isolated, long-term poverty. 
 These distinct mobility and immobility patterns are a product of the underlying 
distribution of endowments in society and the limits to social interaction. The next section 
uses simulation methods to illustrate these patterns and further examine the underlying 
socioeconomic structures of social network formation that affect economic mobility. 
 
4.4 Basic comparative statics 
 Following from (30), the potential of initially poor household i to escape poverty 
depends on its initial endowment, ),( 00 ii SA , the parameters of the production technology 
),,,( 2121 ααkk and preferences ),( θρ , depreciation rates on both types of capital ),( SA δδ , 
and the conditions that govern its ability to establish social networks and the net 
intertemporal benefits it could derive from social network capital ( )).,,( itii SFBK These 
effects are all quite intuitive. A household’s initial endowment of both physical and social 
network capital contributes unambiguously toward its potential to grow out of poverty. 
Lower asset depreciation rates decrease the savings required to adopt the high return 
production technology and graduate from poverty. Therefore, they unambiguously 
increase household’s upward mobility possibility by enhancing household’s capacity to 
meet this saving requirement autarkically as well as to find social network a productive 
mechanism for growth. Whether or not these stimulate potential for social network in 
mediating growth depends largely on socioeconomic conditions, which govern pattern of 
network formation in the economy. 
 Increased productivity of the low-return production technology ),( 11 αk  
unambiguously increases household’s initial income, which then increases its ability to 
save and to accumulate its way out of poverty. Improved productivity of the high-return 
technology ),( 22 αk  implies greater  savings incentives. This effect could be amplified (or 
muted) by household intertemporal preferences, as reflected in either its time discounting 
( )ρ  or its degree of elasticity of intertemporal substitution ( )θ . All else equal, the higher 
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a household’s future discounting, the more required investment it needs in order to 
converge to the high-level equilibrium.29 The Euler equation meanwhile suggests that the 
higherθ , the higher the return on investment in equilibrium, which implies less 
investment needed to reach the high-level equilibrium. Therefore, all else equal, higher 
θ increases a household’s potential to escape poverty either by making the necessary 
autarkic savings affordable or by making social network construction attractive and 
productive for mediating growth. 
 The ease with which households can form social links likewise matters. Ceteris 
paribus, a household will place greater value on a link the lower the cost of establishing 
it ( )iK , the higher the benefits the link generates ( )iB , and the more productive the social 
network capital is in high return production, i.e., for greater )( itSF ′ . We would expect 
fewer socially excluded or isolated households because social network formation becomes 
more attractive, as well as more use of social networks as a cheaper substitute for autarkic 
physical capital accumulation by mobile households.  
 These simple comparative statics, however, do not imply anything about the effect 
of these variables on the actual capacity of social networks to mediate growth. Nor can we 
infer anything explicitly about the effects of socioeconomic structure, other constraints 
and/or social interaction opportunities on the equilibrium social networks of multiple and 
heterogeneous households, which condition the effects of the above variables and 
parameters on the poor’s capacity to grow their way out of poverty. Analytical solution of 
those effects is intractable.  Therefore, in the next section we use numerical simulations to 
explore these points. 
 
5.   Simulation of endogenous network formation and economic mobility  
 We now simulate households' long-run equilibria for randomly generated 
economies. The analysis assumes 17 households,30 each endowed with randomly 
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30 This arbitrary number was chosen for computational and presentational reasons, to generate a big enough 
population to demonstrate the complex interlinkages, but small enough to display visually and to remain 
tractable in solving the complex matching and optimization problem. 
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generated ( )00 , SA , cumulatively representing the economy’s endowment distribution, 
( )00 , SAλ . Our goal is to illustrate the distinguishable roles of social network capital in 
the economic (im)mobility of the initially poor, as identified in section 4.3. One core 
result is that mobility and immobility patterns and the potential for social network capital 
to mediate economic growth vary with the initial structure of the economy, represented 
here by ( )00 , SAλ and with other variables that condition endogenous network formation 
among households in the economy. Two otherwise identical households, dropped into two 
quite different economies, can follow markedly different patterns. Economic mobility is 
thus, at least in part, socially constructed.  
 Figures 5-10 each depict a randomly generated economy. Households are 
represented by their initial endowment positions plotted on the ( )00 , SA  plane. Their long-
run equilibria (either high- or low-level) are represented by the shapes in the plots. A dot 
represents a household that enjoys the high-level equilibrium in period 1, a triangle 
represents a socially isolated household, and an “x” represents a socially excluded one. 
The equilibrium bilateral links are represented by lines connecting two households. In 
each figure, a downward sloping curve reflects the static asset poverty threshold ( )0SA .  
All those to the southwest of that line (shaded in blue) initially (in period 0) choose the 
low-productivity technology. We focus our discussion on this subpopulation, on the 
economic mobility (or immobility) of the initially poor. 
 Figure 5 provides a simple illustration of the distinct patterns that emerge from the 
baseline model.31 The initially poor who escape from poverty without forming new social 
networks are represented by the household with initial endowment (3,7). Those who form 
social networks and escape poverty fall into two sub-groups. Some climb out of poverty 
through solidarity among the initially poor (the cluster of the four households with the 
lowest 0S  endowments), while others successfully link to the initially non-poor (the 
household initially endowed with (6,5)). Then there are those who remain trapped in 
poverty, either due to social exclusion (the two households marked “x”) or to self-
                                                 
 
31 This particular set of random endowments, which we label “Economy 1”, will be used again in Figures 12 
and 13 to demonstrate particular points. The label is meant to facilitate visual comparison across these 
figures. 
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imposed social isolation (the three households with the lowest 0A  endowments). These 
patterns obviously vary with the parameterization chosen, as discussed above with respect 
to the model’s simple comparative statics. Appendix 3 discusses our sensitivity analysis 
by exploring the impact of deviations from the baseline parameterization in 100 randomly 
generated economies.    
 Figure 6 then abstracts from the specific households and their links to map the space 
of these different mobility and immobility patterns. The horizontal line at the dynamic 
asset threshold *oA  represents the dynamic asset poverty line in the absence of social 
network capital, as in Carter and Barrett (2006). Those households in area A have a large 
enough endowment of productive assets, 0A , to save in the first period and thereby 
accumulate sufficient traditional capital to reach the high-level equilibrium without 
recourse to social network capital. Some households in region A might nonetheless 
establish social links as a substitute for savings and traditional capital accumulation. But 
households in region A are all independently economically mobile. 
 Those households beneath the dynamic asset threshold *0A all require social network 
capital in order to exit poverty. They can be divided into three distinct groups. Those in 
area D, whose initial endowments place them above the static asset poverty line with 
social network capital, ( )0SA , are initially non-poor because of their social network 
capital endowment in spite of their otherwise-insufficient endowment of traditional 
capital.  Not only do they enjoy the high-level equilibrium in period 1, but they are able to 
reach the high-level equilibrium in period 0, unlike those with somewhat greater 
traditional capital but lesser social network capital endowments.  
 The dynamic asset threshold ( )0/ 00*0 =XSA  distinguishes among the final two 
groups. Those in area B are endowed with sufficient social network capital to complement 
productive asset accumulation and escape from poverty, even without forming new social 
links. While social network capital is necessary for their economic mobility, their initial 
endowment suffices to shelter them from depending on others’ willingness to establish 
new links with them. By contrast, others (in area C) can only make it out of poverty if 
they successfully establish new social links and thereby augment their initial social 
network capital endowment as a complement to traditional capital accumulation. This 
 
 
33
group’s economic mobility thus depends fundamentally on the underlying structure of the 
economy, in particular on their social distance from others and the feasible distance over 
which links can form within the economy. Figure 6’s mapping of endowment space thus 
underscores the multiple roles social network capital can play in conditioning household 
economic growth paths, either serving as a substitute for or a complement to traditional 
productive assets, enabling immediate or delayed exit from poverty, and ensuring 
independent, albeit social network-mediated mobility, or requiring the establishment of 
new social links non-cooperatively.   
 Figures 7-10 illustrate the impact of the initial socioeconomic structure of the 
economy on the mobility of the initially poor. Each figure focuses on a distinct type of 
initially poor household – from group A, B or C in Figure 6 – and displays four panels 
that differ solely by the initial distribution of households in the economy. The 
southeastern panel in each figure shows the case of a highly polarized economy, so that 
we can underscore the impact of socio-economic polarization on the economic mobility of 
the poor, a point raised insightfully by Mogues and Carter (2005). 
 Figures 7 and 8 depict the initially poor who are autarkically mobile, in the former 
case irrespective of social network capital, in the case of Figure 8, thanks to their initial 
endowment of social network capital. Neither household a in Figure 7 nor household b in 
Figure 8 need to establish social links in order to climb out of poverty from period 0 to 
period 1. Their ability to reach the high-level equilibrium is thus not affected by structure 
of economy. But their choice as to whether or not to form new links with others varies 
with the underlying structure of the economy in which they find themselves. In the 
(southeastern) case of the polarized economy, neither has any incentive to invest in links 
with others and thus climbs out of poverty without any new social relationships. In the 
southwestern case in each Figure, they choose to link with other initially poor households 
only, while in the northwestern case in each Figure they choose to link also with initially 
non-poor households. Their social arrangements are the byproduct of the underlying 
endowment distribution in the economy even though they in no sense depend on further 
social relations to reach the high-level equilibrium. This has an important implication for 
empirical studies. The presence in a sample of independently economically mobile 
households who may or may not find it optimal to build social networks can generate 
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considerable cross-sample differences in the correlation between household-level 
economic mobility and social network density.    
 Figure 9 illustrates perhaps the most interesting case. Here we see how the 
underlying structure of the economy conditions economic mobility for some of the 
initially poor, those (such as household c) in what Figure 6 labeled area C. In the 
northwestern panel, a link with a socially proximate household that is initially non-poor 
enables socially-mediated exit from poverty. In the northeastern panel, economic mobility 
is achieved through multiple links with other, similarly initially poor households in area 
C. In the lower two panels of Figure 9, however, household c gets trapped in poverty. In 
the southwestern case, there are socially proximate households with which it would like to 
link, but it is rebuffed in its proposal to form a network. The result is social exclusion in 
equilibrium. In the polarized economy32 case, there is no socially proximate household 
with whom a connection would be beneficial, so the household prefers no links and thus 
settles into a socially isolated equilibrium. The subpopulation represented by C in Figure 
9 is thus the group for whom social networks and the underlying structure of society 
fundamentally shape economic mobility (or immobility). 
 Finally, as shown in Figure 10, some households are so destitute initially that they 
almost never find social relations sufficiently beneficial to enable a climb out of poverty.  
They are thus socially isolated in almost all configurations of the economy. The key thing 
to note about social isolation is that, at least under the parameterization we employ, it 
depends primarily on a household’s initial endowment of traditional, productive capital.  
Those who begin too poor simply can’t leverage their meager endowments no matter how 
skillfully they interconnect themselves with others. This is underscored more sharply in 
Figure 11 which plots the results from 100 randomly generated economies. There emerges 
a clear asset threshold below which individuals lose any incentive to establish social 
networks with others. Social exclusion and socially-mediated climbs out of poverty are, 
however, generally quite difficult to predict due to the fact that those patterns depend so 
heavily on the underlying structure of the economy.   
 
                                                 
 
32 We label this particular initial endowment “Economy 2” for further use in Figure 13. 
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6.   Crowding-in possibilities created by endogenous social networks 
The endogeneity of social networks can quite fundamentally affect prospective 
interventions by governmental or non-governmental agencies. We illustrate this with 
reference to one specific problem of particular relevance to poverty reduction programs: 
transfers to the poor. Under the maintained (implicit) hypothesis that agents’ social 
networks are exogenously fixed, Cox et al. (1995) and Cox et al. (2004), among others, 
argue that public transfers can crowd out private transfers because the altruistic or 
insurance motivation for a transfer is diminished by public support. Attempts to aid the 
poor could thus be thwarted by induced private responses to public interventions.  
If, however, households’ networks of social relationships are formed endogenously, 
then transfers could change the configuration of networks. Indeed, if social networks are 
endogenous, well-targeted public transfers may have the opposite effect to that posited in 
the existing literature. Transfers can crowd in private support by reducing the social 
distance between individuals and thereby encouraging the creation of new social links, 
enabling recipients to access newfound social network capital and to escape from poverty. 
Such crowding-in effects depend, however, on the structure of the underlying economy, 
reinforcing a core point of the preceding section.  
 We illustrate this crowding-in possibility by repeating the previous simulations, but 
now adding targeted transfers to specific households. Figure 12 visualizes our base case 
without transfers, overlaying four specific households – e, f, g and h – with region C 
identified in figure 6. The upper two rows of Figure 13 then illustrate the possible 
crowding-in effects for four distinct cases of transfers to the households depicted in Figure 
12 – using exactly the same initial endowments, i.e.,  economy 1. The bottom row of 
Figure 13 presents two different cases of transfers to every poor household in a polarized 
economy (economy 2, previously depicted without transfers in the southeastern quadrant 
of Figure 9).   
 The upper left example in Figure 13 shows the case of a household (e) that was 
previously too poorly endowed with capital to make costly formation of social networks 
attractive. In the absence of a transfer, it therefore chooses social isolation and persistent 
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poverty, as shown in Figure 12. But with the benefit of a modest transfer,33 and given the 
social proximity of other households, this transfer encourages e to link to others, enabling 
it to leverage social network capital to escape poverty. Moreover, the induced re-
formation of social networks also permits two other households to escape from poverty.  
These households were socially excluded in the no-transfer economy depicted in Figure 
12 but now are able to band together, using newly created social network capital to access 
the high-level equilibrium in period 1. The central left graphic in Figure 13 shows a 
qualitatively similar result, this time with a 20% smaller transfer (0.8 units of A) because 
the recipient (household g) is more proximate to other households than household e was, 
ex ante, in Figure 12. It therefore requires less of a transfer to induce the creation of new 
social links, and thus an expansion of social network capital that not only lifts the transfer 
recipient out of poverty, but also two other households that would otherwise remain 
persistently poor. Targeting plainly matters, as we emphasize below. 
 The upper right example in Figure 13 shows a similar effect, in this case through a 
one unit transfer to household f, which was socially excluded in the no-transfer setting 
(Figure 12), but now links to three other households, one of which was already able to 
climb out of poverty through autarkic savings, another of which was, like f, socially 
excluded but can leverage its new social link to accumulate enough social network capital 
to climb out of poverty by period 1, and the third of which expands its pre-existing social 
network. 
 Lest it seem that transfers have an automatic beneficial effect in inducing the 
creation of new social network capital, the right central graphic in Figure 13 illustrates 
how even relatively large transfers – 1.5 units of A to household h – can fail to generate 
poverty reduction gains when they are poorly targeted. Although the transfer brings 
household h right to the threshold of autarkic escape from poverty, makes social linkages 
attractive to it and clearly leaves it better off than it would have been without the transfer, 
h’s relative social distance from other households leave it socially excluded and 
persistently poor even in the wake of a relatively large transfer. 
                                                 
 
33 This transfer is just one unit of A, worth one-quarter of the poor recipient household’s initial capital stock 
and just 0.6% of the wealth of this 17-person economy. 
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 Transfers do not have to induce the creation of social links with those who are 
already able to climb out of poverty in order to generate crowding-in effects. Even in a 
highly polarized economy, such as that previously depicted in the lower right quadrant of 
Figure 9, transfers to multiple poor households can stimulate the emergence of a solidarity 
network among the poor that enables several of them to escape poverty. This effect is 
shown in the lower left portion of Figure 13, which simulates the transfer of two units of 
A to each ex ante poor household. This transfer is clearly welfare-improving for all, but 
only facilitates an exit from poverty for some, the five households who establish a 
solidarity network from which they optimally exclude one other poor beneficiary 
household and which three other poor beneficiaries do not wish to join, preferring social 
isolation to costly linkage to the new network.   
 However, the induced social network capital creation effect that stimulates 
economic mobility for some ex ante poor households is by no means automatic. Too 
meager a transfer can improve recipients’ welfare but fail to generate the bigger gains 
associated with a leap to the high-level equilibrium, as illustrated in the lower right 
graphic in Figure 13, which shows the result of transfers to all poor households of just one 
unit of A instead of two units, as in the previous example. Collectively, these examples 
underscore how important core targeting questions – who? how much? – are to the 
poverty reduction effects of transfer programs and how endogenous social network 
formation fundamentally affects the efficacy of such programs. Well-targeted transfers 
can lift even non-recipients out of long-term poverty, while poorly-targeted transfers can 
fail to facilitate economic mobility even for recipients. 
  
7.   Conclusions 
Social network capital can be an important facilitator of upward mobility to escape 
persistent poverty. But costly social networking is no panacea. Not all households find it 
worthwhile to link to others and some will be rebuffed in their efforts to build a network.  
Moreover, the usefulness of social networks depends fundamentally on the underlying 
structure of the economy in which agents reside. In some settings, well-targeted public 
transfers to selected poor households can catalyze the creation of new social network 
capital, thereby multiplying the poverty reduction effects of interventions. 
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We illustrate these points by developing a highly stylized model of heterogeneous 
households that make consumption, investment and social networking decisions in a 
dynamic, interlinked setting. Depending on their initial endowment positions, social 
network capital substitutes for productive assets for some households, while for others it 
complements their productive assets in facilitating productivity growth and economic 
mobility.  
One fundamental point that emerges from this exercise is that the exclusionary 
mechanisms necessary for people to be trapped in poverty (Carter and Barrett 2006) may 
arise endogenously due to the inherent costliness of establishing and maintaining social 
links. In our setting, with multiple technologies that create locally increasing returns to 
productive capital but no credit market to permit individuals to borrow the capital 
necessary to exit poverty in time, costless access to social network capital would provide 
an alternate pathway out of poverty, a socially-mediated solution to a market failure.  
When establishing social links is costly, however, some households may opt out of 
networks, choosing social isolation and persistent poverty instead. And when the net 
benefits of social links are asymmetric, other households may desire social links that 
would help them climb out of poverty, but are rebuffed by prospective links and thus left 
in a state of social exclusion and persistent poverty. These social exclusionary 
mechanisms are economy-specific, depending fundamentally on the underlying 
socioeconomic conditions and distribution of endowments that determine feasibility of 
social interaction and the net benefits to agents of social links. As a result, four distinct 
mobility and immobility patterns may co-exist among the initially poor: (1) exit from 
poverty through autarkic saving, (2) socially mediated exit from poverty, (3) a poverty 
trap due to social exclusion, and (4) a poverty trap associated with self-imposed social 
isolation. Although in many ways this model is kept quite artificially simple, it suffices to 
illustrate that the causal links between social network capital and economic mobility are 
highly context specific and need not be empirically identifiable in a way that is 
generalizable across economies.   
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Figure 1: Locally increasing return production technology  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Locally increasing return production technology when acquiring more social 
networking capital ( tt SS >′ ) 
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Figure 3: Example economy with { }5,4,3,2,1=N  and initial distribution ( )00 , SAλ  
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Figure 4: Example of endogenous network formation 
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   The progress of interaction procedure is shown below, “→” stands for “propose to”   
 
       
                Round 1            Round 2       Round 3   
 
HH 1:       2→     No              2→    No        
  
         3→    Match              3→    Match  ⎯⎯⎯ →⎯ destablishe ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
0*
1X  
   HH 2:      3→    No           3→    Match     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
0*
2X  
             
   HH 3:                 1→    Match             1→     Match    
         4→    No               2→    Match     
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=
0
1
1
*
3X  
   HH 4:                 5→    Match     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
0*
4X   
         
   HH 5:                 4→    Match     1*5 =X  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium yields the set of links at equilibrium: { }.45,23,13* =g   
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Figure 5: Basic simulation illustration 
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Figure 6: The space of social mobility and immobility in one simulated economy 
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Figure 7: Different patterns for an autarkically mobile household 
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Figure 8: Different patterns for a household autarkically mobile given its 0S  
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Figure 9: Different patterns for a household whose mobility depends on social links 
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Figure 10: Different patterns for a destitute, economically immobile household 
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Figure 11: Equilibrium social networks and long-run equilibria for 100 economies 
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Figure 12: Households and regions combined in a simulated economy 
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Figure 13: Targeted transfers and “crowding in” effects 
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Appendix 1: Network simulation statistics 
 
Figure A1: Sample proportion of those getting their first best network 
vs. number of households feasible for social link 
(100 economies of 17 households) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Sample proportion of those getting their first best network 
vs. number of households in the first best network 
(100 economies of 17 households) 
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Appendix 2: Parameterization of the simulation 
Baseline Case: 
1. Utility:; 95.0,0 == ρθ , 2=C . 
2. Production technology: 
( ) itSit kkSF −= 43 , 9,5.0,25.0,2.1,9,5.8,9 214321 ======= Fkkkk αα  
3. Social interaction: 5=d  
4. Cost/benefit of link: ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
0
0
1 ),()(
i
j
i A
A
jidjK θ , 00302)( ijji AAAjB −−= θθ  
33.0,4.0,125.0 321 === θθθ  
5. Asset accumulation: 05.0== AS δδ  
6. Endowment: [ ]20,00 ∈A  , [ ]10,00 ∈S  .  
 
Deviation from the baseline case: 
 
For each randomly generated economy with ( )00 , SAλ , N=17 with randomly generated 
initial endowments ( )00 , SA : [ ]20,00 ∈A , 80 =Aµ  , 1520 =Aσ  
[ ]10,00 ∈S , 50 =Sµ  , 1020 =Sσ  
 
Parameterization and functional forms for deviation cases 
(Holding other specifications constant for each case): 
(1) 1→θ   (7) 03125.01 =θ  (13) 7.02 =θ   (19) 5.220 =Sσ  
(2) 1=d   (8) 1875.01 =θ  (14) 5.720 =Aσ  (20) 1520 =Sσ  
(3) 3=d   (9) 21875.01 =θ  (15) 75.320 =Aσ  (21) 5.1720 =Sσ  
(4) 6=d   (10) 2.02 =θ   (16) 5.2220 =Aσ  
(5) 7=d   (11) 3.02 =θ   (17) 25.2620 =Aσ  
(6) 0625.01 =θ  (12) 6.02 =θ   (18) 520 =Sσ  
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Appendix 3: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 This Appendix briefly describes the results of sensitivity analysis with respect to 
several key parameters.  The leftmost column of Table A1 identifies the relevant change 
to the underlying parameter value, relative to the baseline (details in Appendix 2). Table 
A1 reports the effects of deviations from the baseline model parameterization (holding 
everything else constant) on equilibrium social network formation in the economy (the 
first two numeric columns refer to the whole economy, the next two columns to initially 
poor households only), and (in the final eight columns) how the parameter change affects 
the proportion of initially poor households that are (1) economically mobile through 
autarkic savings, (2) economically mobile utilizing successfully established social 
network, (3) trapped in poverty due to social exclusion, and (4) trapped in poverty due to 
social isolation.  
 The first row shows what happens as we move away from the extreme baseline 
case, )0( =θ  in which households have maximal willingness to shift consumption across 
periods, to unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ).1( →θ  Despite the fact that 
the number of links formed in the economy and by the initially poor decrease in most 
economies, increasing θ , all else equal, results in more economic mobility via either 
autarkic saving or social network formation, and fewer households trapped in poverty due 
to either social exclusion or social isolation. Thus individual preferences plainly matter to 
mobility and network linkage patterns. But the relationship between the extent of social 
linkage and economic mobility need not be unambiguously positive.  
 Social link formation obviously responds to changes in the maximal distance 
permitting social interaction, d . Rows (2)-(5) present the effects of different directions 
and magnitudes of change in d . Intuitively, as the space for social interaction shrinks 
radically, by 80%, there is of course a universal sharp reduction in equilibrium links 
formed, including by the initially poor. This also leads to an increase in autarkically 
mobile households in 81% of the economies, as social network capital is less commonly 
feasible as a substitute for physical capital accumulation, and to an increase in incidence 
of social exclusion (isolation) in most (all) economies. Less intuitively, for a smaller 
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decrease (40%) in d , link formation may actually increase. In 63% of the economies, the 
number of links formed grows; this figure is far higher among the initially poor (92%).  
The reason is that a narrower domain of feasible social interaction induces more 
reciprocity of desired links among socially proximate clusters of households. With fewer 
feasible or desired links, households are more likely to seek, and in equilibrium make, 
links with those with whom they wish to form a network (see Figure A2 in Appendix 1). 
Somewhat lower d encourages more links among the poor, as they become less likely to 
seek out – and be rejected by – better-off households within the domain of socially 
feasible interactions. The results is greater economic mobility using social networks and 
less using autarkic savings; as well as more self-selected social isolation and less social 
exclusion. These are especially interesting and somewhat counterintuitive results that 
merit further research in the future. 
 Increasing d generates corresponding results, with large increases generating less 
mobility via social networks and fewer links formed by the initially poor due to the 
increased likelihood of unrequited invitations to better-off households.  The core finding 
is thus that social network formation and economic mobility patterns are not monotone in 
d .  Increasing the social distance across which individuals can feasibly connect does not 
guarantee more links or mobility in an economy. It may merely lead to greater 
unsuccessful attempts to link, with adverse consequences for some initially poor 
households whose aspirations go unfulfilled.  
 Rows (6)-(9) show the effect of changing the gross cost of establishing social links, 
while rows (10)-(13) show the equivalent effects of changing the gross benefits of social 
links.  The effects are generally as one would expect. Increased costs (decreased benefits) 
of social link formation reduce the number of links formed overall, and result in greater 
social isolation.  The effects on social exclusion are, again, not monotone in either costs or 
benefits because of the complex matching problem in economies of many heterogeneous 
agents.   
 The final two blocks of columns in Table A1 explore how dispersion in the initial 
endowments of physical and social network capital affect mobility and social network 
formation. The results are reasonably intuitive. As the standard deviation of endowments 
(of physical or social network capital) increases in the economy, fewer social links result, 
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and agents switch from socially mediated to autarkic growth strategies. The effects on 
patterns of social exclusion and isolation are less clear, again due to the inherent 
complexities of multi-agent matching. This is of course consistent with the common 
empirical observation that lower asset inequality is positively associated with higher rates 
of economic growth.   
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Table A1: Effects on Equilibrium Social Network and Mobility Patterns 
(all figures reflect the proportion of economies experiencing change of that sign) 
Model Specification Number of Number of 
Economies with change in the mobility of initially poor 
agents 
links formed  links formed  Economically Economically Trapped in  Trapped in  
in economy by initially  Mobile via Mobile via Poverty: Poverty: 
Autarkic Social Socially 
  
  
  
 
  
poor agents 
  Savings 
Social 
Networks Exclusion Isolation 
Deviation from Baseline34     +     -      +     -      +     -      +     -      +     -     +     -  
Utility:                           
(1) Decrease elasticity of 
intertemporal subst. )1( →θ  0.00 1.00 0.12 0.64 1.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.00 1.00
Social Interaction: d                          
(2) 80% Decrease   0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.81 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.55 1.00 0.00
(3) 40% Decrease   0.63 0.27 0.92 0.10 0.10 0.35 0.45 0.20 0.20 0.36 0.27 0.09
(4) 20% Increase   0.42 0.15 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.27 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
(5) 40% Increase   0.36 0.27 0.25 0.36 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.36 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
Network Costs: )( jK i                          
(6) 50% Decrease 0.64 0.18 0.55 0.36 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.56 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.27
(7) 75% Decrease 0.85 0.10 0.73 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.45 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.40
(8) 50% Increase  0.28 0.64 0.45 0.36 0.10 0.36 0.45 0.26 0.18 0.31 0.18 0.00
(9) 75% Increase 0.09 0.73 0.18 0.45 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.36 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.00
Network Benefits: )( jBi                          
(10) 50% Decrease 0.18 0.55 0.15 0.73 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.64 0.55 0.20 0.37 0.00
(11) 75% Decrease 0.18 0.82 0.09 0.72 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.64 0.18 0.36 0.90 0.00
(12) 50% Increase 0.57 0.21 0.45 0.27 0.00 0.30 0.37 0.19 0.27 0.00 0.09 0.18
(13) 75% Increase 0.64 0.27 0.73 0.27 0.10 0.36 0.64 0.27 0.20 0.36 0.18 0.18
Endowment:                         
(holding mean assets constant)                        
Dispersion of A                         
(14) 50% Decrease   0.55 0.24 0.73 0.18 0.00 0.40 0.82 0.18 0.36 0.45 0.78 0.15
(15) 75% Decrease   0.73 0.15 0.73 0.27 0.00 0.30 0.82 0.09 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
(16) 50% Increase 0.18 0.73 0.00 0.73 0.27 0.27 0.04 0.36 0.55 0.30 0.21 0.73
(17) 75% Increase 0.09 0.91 0.18 0.73 0.45 0.09 0.20 0.75 0.36 0.40 0.75 0.15
Dispersion of S                         
(18) 50% Decrease   0.12 0.64 0.05 0.82 0.00 0.12 0.27 0.37 0.28 0.31 0.64 0.20
(19) 75% Decrease   0.20 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.56 0.30 0.33 0.82 0.18
(20) 50% Increase 0.18 0.75 0.15 0.79 0.00 0.36 0.09 0.78 0.10 0.42 0.81 0.12
(21) 75% Increase 0.18 0.82 0.18 0.82 0.29 0.22 0.18 0.82 0.09 0.55 0.82 0.18
 
 
                                                 
 
34 Proportions do not always add up to one since there are economies with no change in some categories. 
